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Review

Reviewed Work(s): Habsburgs and Ottomans between Vienna and Belgrade, 1683-1739 by Ivan Parvev

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unaligned island state's only means of survival were understood to rest. Robert Brenner's *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653* (1993; rev. ante, xvi [1994], 127) may not have appeared in time for Jones's use, but in a long postscript Brenner shows that leading Commonwealth statesmen, in close touch with certain merchants, were thinking very pointedly about these things. Moreover, when one observes that the escalation in early 1652 took place mainly in the maritime sphere – exasperated by England's persistent stop-and-search practices, the Dutch mobilized a 150-ship navy, 'the most provocative initiative imaginable, the single most important cause of the ensuing war' (p. 113) – one may be further inclined to regard the future of sea power, not just trade, as the prime cause of this war. Certainly the conduct of the war itself bears this out.

The question of the causes of these wars is of most interest to readers of this journal and also seems to be of most interest to Jones. But the high level of analysis that he has applied to this question is also to be found in his approaches to many other topics. In addition to the admirable chapters on contexts, there is the careful attention given to the predicaments, strategic and political, that the Dutch leadership had to confront; there is a very thorough examination of the third war, from all sides including the French (something that has been needed for a long time); and there are the well-researched narratives of naval strategy and tactics in each of the three wars. This does not begin to exhaust my list of reasons why this is a book to keep at hand.

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DANIEL A. BAUGH

IVAN PARVEV. *Habsburgs and Ottomans between Vienna and Belgrade, 1683-1739*. Boulder: East European Monographs, 1996; dist. New York: Columbia University Press. Pp. xviii, 345. \$42.00 (US).

IVAN PARVEV ATTEMPTS to bring a new interpretation to one of the most critical periods for the Ottoman Empire in its relations with the Habsburg Monarchy, the most powerful opponent of the Ottomans in the period 1683-1789. Unlike Parvev, none of the earlier studies of this period, critically reviewed in the book (xii-xviii), has examined Ottoman-Habsburg relations in this broad perspective. As a general theme, the author suggests that the struggle for south-east Europe between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire took a definite turn in favour of the former in the years between 1699 and 1739. Further, this Habsburg hegemony led to the emergence of the so-called Eastern Question within the European states system. Parvev examines whether or not territorial expansion in the Balkans was a real objective for the Habsburgs in this period.

Briefly reviewing the military and political developments between 1683 and

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1739, the author discusses the place of the Ottoman Empire in the European system of states. He notes that 'it is unfounded', for the period 1526-1750, 'to disregard the Ottoman factor in European international relations' (p. 249). Although on the European continent, some modes and patterns of interactions among the European states had been worked out, could the European states automatically accept the newcomer, the Ottoman state, as an equal political partner (p. 259)? Parvev emphasizes that there were basic economic, religious, ideological, and social differences between the Ottoman state and the European states.

According to the definition of 'balance of power', one basic condition is that no country may be much more powerful than another. However, by virtue of already being so powerful in the period 1526-1683, the Ottoman Empire was a threat to the European balance of power; thus, as Parvev argues, one could rather speak of a 'European-Ottoman balance of power' (p. 253). Continuing this chain of reasoning, Parvev presupposes that even in this period 'the Christian states had to unite to avert [the Ottoman] threat.' This judgement, I believe, derives not from historical reality, but rather from the medieval crusader ideology perpetuated by the papacy in modern times. What was actually occurring in the sixteenth century, and earlier, was that coalitions against the Ottomans were actualized only when the direct interests of the participating states were vitally threatened by the Ottomans – Venice and Hungary in the fifteenth century and the Habsburgs, Venice, and Russia in the period 1526-1681.

Many papal plans to unite the European states against the Ottomans failed because individual states felt that their immediate interests were not threatened, or because Ottoman diplomacy succeeded in appeasing such localized fears (for a recent detailed account of such abortive plans, see K. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant: Volumes I-IV* [1976-84]). It is a historical fact that the Papal State itself made contact with the Ottoman Sultan in an effort to counter Charles VIII who declared that he would fight against the Ottomans after the invasion of Italy. Actually, several Renaissance states, including Milan, Genoa, Venice, Naples, Florence, and Ferrara, each employed, at one time or another, the Ottoman threat or mercenary troops against a rival. In fact, the Ottoman state was a power that served to preserve the 'balance of power' in Italy throughout the fifteenth century. Also, how can a historian ignore the systematic Ottoman support to the Protestants throughout Europe as well as the Ottoman factor in promoting the spread of Calvinism in Transylvania in the next century? The Ottoman place in the European states system is highlighted at Karlovci in 1699, when England and the Netherlands made earnest efforts to conclude a peace between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans so that a European coalition would enjoy full Habsburg participation in the struggle against France.

Parvev's claims that there existed no diplomatic instrument of alliance between a European state and the Sultan, and no reference to Ottoman participation in a continental peace conference during the period 1526-1798, is easily dismissed.

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The reason for the seeming lack of Ottoman involvement is obvious. At the time, states' immediate needs and interests were often in conflict with the religious sentiment of the masses; therefore, states tended to conceal such dealings with the 'infidel'. Emperor Charles V's propaganda pamphlets seeking to expose Francis I's actual alliance with the Ottomans are well known. The king had to pursue his contacts in absolute secrecy. Several examples of *actual* alliances, which existed despite the lack of a formal legal instrument (pp. 252-8), cannot be dismissed by a historian merely for the sake of an adopted thesis. Furthermore, whenever state interest required, Islamic religious law readily recognized peaceful and friendly relations with non-Muslim states in return for economic and political benefits. Capitulations were religiously approved grants of guarantees to any non-Muslim state which proved itself reliable and remained friendly with the Ottomans. Although it is true that the Ottoman Sultans considered themselves supreme in dealings with European states throughout the period under examination, this convention did not prevent the Sultans from treating their counterparts as equals nor from accepting reciprocity in actual relations with European powers. The French king, for example, was addressed as *Padishah* whereas the Russian ruler waited a long time before being addressed in a like fashion. Only if one adheres to a formal interpretation of international law as developed in Europe in those centuries can one maintain the thesis that the Ottoman state was not a member of the European states system. In the final analysis, Parvev himself has to admit that the 'peculiar European-Ottoman political structure, incorporating relations between the two members', is 'a chronological predecessor of the actual integration of the Sultan's state in the continental system, legally accomplished in 1856' (p. 258).

The author also notes the 'Čiprovi uprising' of 1688 (see page xvii n. 11, for the titles of Bulgarian publications concerning the event) and the 'Karpos uprising' (p. 92), although these events remained as local incidents (pp. 92, 98). These uprisings were originally encouraged by the Habsburgs whose armies then penetrated into the heart of the Balkans; the emperor then declared himself, in 1689, the liberator of Christian *reaya*. No mention is made of the fact that, in response, the Ottoman administration felt obliged to take drastic measures in order to alleviate the tax burdens imposed on the *reaya* by moderating the *djizya*/capitation tax under Grand Vizier Köprülü Fazıl Mustafa. In any case, Parvev concludes that the Habsburgs first encountered the true Balkan problems only in the period 1688-90. An intensely negative approach to Ottoman rule on the part of Balkan historians in general is still visible in the work, and prevents Parvev from making critical use of his sources.

The author draws attention to the point (p. 97) that the Rascian people (*Rätziches Volk*) referred to in the contemporary Habsburg sources included not only Serbs but also Bulgarians when the term was applied to the regions of western Bulgaria.

A number of errors occur in the volume as far as Turkish names and terms are

concerned (Fasil Ahmed, for example). As for the sources used in the present work, the evidence from Ottoman sources has been neglected, although main western archival as well as the basic literature in western languages have nevertheless been consulted. General works on the Ottomans by J. von Hammer, J. W. Zinkeisen, and N. Jorga are the main references.

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HALIL INALCIK

DALE HOAK and MORDECHAI FEINGOLD, eds. *The World of William and Mary: Anglo-Dutch Perspectives on the Revolution of 1688-89*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996. Pp. xv, 339. \$49.50 (US).

THE TRICENTENARY OF the Glorious Revolution in 1688-9 prompted a predictable spate of publications, many of them – like the present volume under review – the outgrowth of specially held commemorative conferences. Most of the conference proceedings have been somewhat uneven; this is the weakest of the bunch. Several of the contributors have already appeared in a number of other tricentenary publications, and consequently have nothing much new to say here. Some are reduced to summarizing arguments they have developed elsewhere; others to offering a series of miscellaneous musings that do not add up to very much.

The concept behind the book is actually an intriguing one. Thus, the editors have sought to broaden our perspective on the Glorious Revolution, partly by emphasizing the Dutch and international contexts, but also by asking probing questions about ‘the broad structure of belief systems that informed the opinions and actions of contemporaries’ (p. viii) and how these might have been changed by the Revolution. In addition to chapters on traditional themes such as the constitutional settlement, the succession, and the establishment of religious toleration, there are essays on millenarianism, witchcraft, and various topics in Anglo-Dutch cultural history (including garden art by John Dixon Hunt). By far the best chapters are those on the Netherlands. Ernestine van der Wall examines the extent to which the events of 1688-9 were read in an apocalyptic millenarian light by Dutch divines, and finds that a diluted prophetic tradition, shorn of its erstwhile radical associations, continued to flourish in the era of William and Mary. Willem Frijhoff writes of ‘a Glorious Revolution of the mind’ (p. 216) that took place in the time of William and Mary, whereby Dutch élites were able to emancipate themselves from the old magical and demonological world-view. Wijnand W. Mijnhardt, in a compelling essay on Dutch culture in the period 1670-1730, challenges the traditional ‘Frenchification’ thesis (that national culture lost its unique character and capitulated to French cultural influences), and shows how fear of being overthrown culturally by the French produced a reaffirmation of traditional tenets of Dutch culture in certain spheres, particularly literary and scholarly circles. The

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